Introduction
The article takes up an audit event that The OAG used its VFM techniques in the Department in 1992 Department in , 1995 Department in , 1997 Department in and 1999 and its reports did not anticipate the internal audit findings (Morin, 2000:452) .
Abstract. The article describes the nearly year-long political and media uproar that followed on the release in January, 2000 of a qualitative or soft "audit" of management control in the federal government department, Human Resources Development Canada, and analyses the contributing factors. The article argues that the auditors' examination of project files for programs delivered by grants and contributions was so abstract and poorly executed that nothing whatever can be concluded from the work. Factors that favoured the "scandal" interpretation include across-government New
The programs had satisfied the annual financial audit for probity for the Public Accounts of Canada. How was it, then, that the Department and the Government itself was blown off course for most of a year?
The purpose of the paper is to probe the case as an over-determined event of a kind that will surely recur in Canada. A level of risk is likewise present in each of the Westminster democracies that experienced the imposition of the New Public
Management on a modern audit society.
The aspects of the case that spring from audit technology, or the lack of it, are illuminated by the work of the critical theorist, Michael Power (1997) Throughout, I will yield to usage, employing the term "audit" for both financial audit and the soft consultancy-type products first developed for application to the private sector, but I will identify each study I discuss as either a financial audit or a qualitative-soft piece of work. I will also use the title "auditor" for the personnel working in any federal audit function even though notable proportions do not hold accounting credentials. 3 
3
The gist of the article is that there never was evidence that an annual billion-dollar fund was out of control or habitually The main sources for the study are public documents. 4 
"The Scandal"
The body of the 2000 IAB report released on January 19 specifies a dual purpose: one goal, as a management study, is to assess the management and delivery of all HRDC programs whose instrument is grants and contributions against "applicable" current management standards and against "principles of accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and economy." The study's second goal is to test whether funds awarded to job sponsors are "adequately protected from errors, misappropriation, misuse and abuse, within and outside HRDC." The report further claims that the data's quality is good enough to allow the auditors to "…provide an estimate of the magnitude of the [financial] loss, if any" in programs using grants and contributions as their instrument (p. 5) . This claim was, as noted above, to be the primary catalyst for the scandal. The executive summary says that the "integrity" study covers all of HRDC's programs delivered by grants and contributions except for those assisting the fishery. (Grants are a small proportion of these funds.) Its methodology was to study paper files on awards that were forwarded to headquarters for the purpose. In parallel with the conflicting political stories, two very senior officials -one level below the permanent head of the Department -were offering "technical briefings" directly to the media, without the Minister present. These took place on January 19, February 1, and February 7, 2000 . The briefings were novel to federal administration. But while the Prime Minister was unveiling ever-smaller sums of money, the officials, beset by journalists, were confirming time and again that the audit universe indeed represented one billion in spending, and that the auditors had drawn a random sample of awards. Naturally, supporting their minister, they were also insisting that the audit findings This did not play well for long, however, because if the opposition had proposed, the Government had disposed.
When Audit is not Audit
It was impossible for the Minister to get the media to take on board any distinctions in the meaning of audit. What the Minister needed the media to believe and communicate was that "sloppy administration," and even perhaps "poor bookkeeping" did not translate into stacks of worn taxpayers' cash blowing in the wind.
Through February, March, April and May Minister Stewart had to defend in the House of Commons, in interviews, and in press scrums, a three-part proposition. The first element in the story was that documentation of "management control" -such as a physical form in a file saying when financial monitoring had been done -was in the course of a decade never "appropriate" in the programs implemented through grants and contributions.
The second element was that appropriate documentation is in principle of such fundamental importance that the Department was moving heaven and earth to complete files of control activity on old projects, even freezing current work. The third element was a logic patch that tried and failed to make modern audit practice plausible in ordinary language. Yes, it is important to be sure that management control is "appropriate" and is docu- (Clark, 2000; Sutherland, 1991a Sutherland, , 1991b ).
Organizational and Program History
As 
Modern Audit Practice: Its Rituals
The questions about why three qualitative studies of management controls were conducted as they were become inter- (Morin, 2000: 447) . 
Reversing the Burden of Proof
The evidence-gathering strategy of all three studies is perfectly described by • There is a lack of division of duties … one individual [may] review project funding requests, recommend approval … and approve claim statements (p. 2).
• Regional staff lack adequate financial management and accounting skills (p. 2).
The second two observations above, on fund security and staff skills, are based, anecdotally, on the 22 non-randomly chosen site visits. In effect, the possibility of abuse is seen in examples from the 22 site visits, and from this it is inferred that the practice of program officers is inadequate or risky wherever proof of control activity is not discovered in the larger file sample by the auditors. Another example of unfairness is that regional and local staff are condemned for using judgmental sampling for site visits rather than systematic random sampling -yet this is the auditors' practice.
Probably the most intriguing aspect of this audit is that it explicitly talks about whether there is an empirical connection between full documentation (so that the auditors can use checklists to scrutinize files), and proper project management onsite. On the one hand, the auditors conclude that good files do not predict good management:
If a problem is documented in the file, corrective action is normally under way or has been taken; conversely, a 'clean' file does not give any assurance that the project is managed properly. Most of the project management problems disclosed by this audit could not have been identified by a review of the file. File monitoring cannot therefore be used as a substitute for on-site external monitoring to ensure proper project management (p. 9: emphasis added).
However, monitoring and control systems are a priori important:
… in all instances [of weaknesses found on site] it was evident that more stringent monitoring would have prevented or at least detected the situations … There is no doubt that a persistent situation of weak controls will increase the probability of project mismanagement resulting from negligence, abuse and even fraud," (p. 2, final statement).
Overall, the 1991 study is dramatic, and blind to the features that limit its certainty.
"Follow-up" audit
The 1994 Whereas it would have been useful to directly link monitoring to results from "post-audit," which one assumes is audit of financial probity, this is not done.
In conclusion, because of its sampling choices, the 1994 "follow-up" is irrelevant and probably quite misleading in relation to the 1991 audit of significant contributions. Yet, the tone is certain, and the reporting format is directly misleading.
"Integrity" audit
The 2000 "integrity" study's misleading reporting begins in the title's claim that it is a final report. It cannot be the final report of the imputed series, because it is different in in its both goals and sampling frame. It does not concentrate on significant contributions, and its scope is different again from the 1994 study, which 
Assessment of Audit Quality: Lost on the Audit Trail
The short answer to the question of continuity and cumulativeness between the three studies is that there is none. This is largely because of the total lack of attention to defining conceptual domains and populations to which results would be generalized, and the failure to find reliable sampling frames and engage in defensible sampling strategies. 
Reform-Engineered Disaster

NPM Reforms and Westminster Government
One can paraphrase Donald Kettl's summary of the content of the managerialist revolution as follows:
• productivity, or doing more with less;
• marketization, or using market-style incentives and strategies to overcome the slowing and goal-displacing effects of bureaucratic "command and control" administration;
• service orientation, or finding ways to respond to citizen-supplicants as customers;
• decentralization, or shifting traditional programs to move them closer to the enduser, even where this means shifting power to other governments;
• policy accountability, in which the semantic distinction between policy and implementation is emphasized, partly with the goal of making it seem possible and imperative to track policy effects, and;
• accountability for results, which has generally meant that governments try to find means to replace simple adherence to rules with a bottom-up accountability for outcomes and results (Kettl, 2000: 1-2 
Nexus of OAG-Electoral Politics
Politics in the Representative Institutions
The Liberal party, the centrist "natural party of government," has governed federal Canada for two thirds of the last half century, often as a minority government, its dominance based in either or both of the two large-population provinces, Québec and Ontario. The Liberals' hold on power has high electoral volatility as its constant companion (Sutherland, 1991b (Sutherland, 1991a: 102-105; Sutherland, 1993: 130) , even though Canadian politics is largely about looking for signs of this. For one thing, they are rarely in one job long enough to identify the levers. But political compensation for electoral support is pretty much the glue that has so far held the Canadian union together (Noel, 1992; Simpson, 1988; Stewart, 1986; Whitaker, 1987 (Sinclair, 1979) . The book is seen as a vanity publication: in the fall of 1979, the Office acquired 1,500 copies of the book from the publisher for about $22,500, and made gifts of the books to all staff, provincial auditors and some accounting firms (Howard, 1979: 2) keep back a reserve fund to allow it to respond to "fast-breaking news." Auditors will be policy experts ("deep subject experts") with reputations in government and in "relevant professional circles." The Office will also provide "Parliament" with objective "deep expertise" that is "forwardlooking" (Rattray, 2000) .
Since 1977, the OAG has off-loaded the costs of audit. As noted, the cost to the of that year (OAG, 1983: 53) . The 1989
Report pushes NPM philosophy again:
"Our overall observation is that people are over-administered -too much centralization: too many prescriptions -while, all too often, they experience a lack of real leadership" (OAG, 1989: 35) . Most notably, the OAG's role was crucial to the servicewide set of NPM reforms under PS2000, Earlier this year, the disclosure of serious shortcomings in the management of grants and contributions at Human Resources Development Canada caused a major stir. Public reaction was strong because the amounts involved were large and I believe, because years of rising taxes and shrinking or stagnating household budgets have made the public even more sensitive than usual to lax spending practices in government….
Canadians are justifiably upset by such disclosures. They may agree with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that taxes are the price we pay for civilization, and not begrudge the high taxes they pay to finance necessary public services. But they get upset and angry when they see their tax dollars squandered or used with less care than they must use to make ends meet in their household budgets. Frankly, I share their frustration. (OAG, December 2000, pp. 7-8) .
The AG later issued a separate bound volume containing his reflections on his mandate, where these messages are repeated (OAG, 2001) . In its December summary of the October chapter on HRDC's grants and contributions, the Office also feeds a perception that HRDC exposed its full three billion to risk, whereas two of those three billion are statutory entitlements:
HRDC spent about $3 billion in 1999-2000 on grants and contributions for programs such as job creation and youth employment, as well as for employment benefits and support measures. We examined in detail four of about 40 grant and contribution [sub] programs run by HRDC … (OAG, December, 2000: 11-18.) Only a few weeks after the general election, the official opposition began a process of public disintegration that 
